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Public Debt and Inflation: Empirical Evidence from Ghana 
 
 




This paper investigates the impact of public debt on inflation in Ghana using annual data during 
the period 1983-2018. The study uses the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing 
approach to cointegration and an error correction model to examine this linkage. The cointegrating 
regression results reveal evidence of a stable long run relationship between inflation and the 
explanatory variables in the presence of a structural break. The findings also show a positive and 
significant impact of public debt on inflation. These results were found to hold, irrespective of 
whether the regression was conducted in the short run or the long run. The study confirms the 
presence of the inflationary effects of public debt in Ghana. The government should, therefore, be 
prudent when considering increases in public debt to minimise volatility in inflation and its 
associated risks to the economy.  
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1. Introduction 
The control of inflation dynamics is vital to the monetary and fiscal policy objective. Given the 
significant role that public debt plays in fiscal deficit financing, the relationship between public 
debt and inflation has emerged as a topical issue in recent decades. Policymakers have started 
wondering whether the changing levels of public debt have an influence on inflation. Some central 
banks have adopted inflation-targeting policy largely on the basis that inflation is generally a 
monetarist’s phenomenon. However, some recent studies have found that this assumption is 
obsolete or unfounded. According to Sims (2013, 2014, 2016), persistent and growing fiscal deficit 
finance through government borrowings will eventually produce inflationary pressures, regardless 
of the policies followed by the Central Bank. Hence, debt-financed deficits will require effective 
coordination with the monetary authority to avoid high and unstable inflation rates that may be 
harmful to macroeconomic stability. More so, according to Aimola and Odhiambo (2018), the 
effectiveness of monetary policy in controlling inflation critically depends on its coordination with 
fiscal policy, suggesting that granting Central Bank autonomy in the hope that it will insulate an 
economy from having to accommodate imprudent fiscal policies, may not be successful at curbing 
inflation. The Fiscal Theory of the Price Level (FTPL), as embedded in the non-Ricardian policy 
shows that fiscal authority alone can dominantly influence inflation irrespective of monetary 
policy. 
Available data on inflation for Ghana shows that between 1983 and 2018, the country recorded 
high inflation rates in excess of 25% (Bank of Ghana, 2019 & World Bank, 2019). According to 
Masson et al. (1997), a country would be unable to rely on monetary policy alone to target a stable 
and reduced inflation rate once it experiences annual inflation rates in the range of 15%-25% for 
several consecutive years. Hence, the relationship between public debt and inflation becomes even 
more important in a country such as Ghana as changes in public debt levels tend to be linked to 
rising fiscal deficits. 
Although a number of studies have attempted to examine the relationship between public debt and 
inflation, very few studies have been conducted on African countries, and where studies have been 
done, a significant gap still exists. Not many studies have been conducted on the relationship 
between public debt and inflation in Ghana where public debt has played a vital role in the funding 
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of fiscal deficits. In addition, time-series data were used in these studies, but no attempt has been 
made to address the issue of structural breaks given that Ghana’s economic history has registered 
some structural changes over time. According to Perron (1989), unaddressed breaks may invalidate 
statistical test inference. It is against this argument that the relationship between public debt and 
inflation in Ghana is investigated in this study. Hence, the primary aim of this study is to examine 
the impact of public debt on inflation in Ghana using the ARDL approach. Apart from contributing 
to the literature on public debt and inflation by using Ghana as a case study, to our knowledge, this 
might well be the first study of its kind to examine the dynamic relationship between public debt 
and inflation in Ghana using the ARDL approach to cointegration in the presence of structural 
breaks.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents trends in public debt and inflation 
in Ghana. Section 3 discusses the theoretical and empirical literature review. Section 4 presents 
the estimation technique and empirical analysis. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Public debt and inflation in Ghana  
Ghana’s public debt stock has evolved in the last three decades. As a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP), this represent an increase from 26.88% in 1983 to 57.58% in 2018, with a 
minimum of 19.86% in 2006 and a maximum of 89.22% in 2000 (Bank of Ghana, 2019). The ratio 
between 1983 and 2003, before external public debt relief in 2004, average 49.92% compared to 
40.84% between 2007 and 2018 after external public debt relief (Bank of Ghana, 2019). These 
ratios are an indication that gains from debt relief that reduced this ratio to 19.86% in 2006 were 
short lived. Ghana, in 2004 and 2006, secured external public debt relief under the Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI), respectively, 
reducing public debt to GDP ratio from 58.35% in 2003 to 45.02% in 2004 and from 37.20% in 
2005 to 19.86% in 2006 (Bank of Ghana, 2019). In spite of gains recorded in public debt ratios 
due to debt forgiveness, Ghana’s public debt stock levels have been on the increase, with 
contribution from both external and domestic public debt stock (Bank of Ghana, 2019).  
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The structure of Ghana’s public debt stock can be broadly categorised into external and domestic 
public debt. Prior to debt relief in 2004,  public debt was characterised by huge external borrowing 
by government in meeting its financing needs, which resulted in public debt stock that was largely 
dominated by external public debt stock (Fosu, 2001). The composition of Ghana’s public debt 
stock stood at 49.78% for external public debt stock and 50.21% for domestic public debt stock as 
at end 2018 (Bank of Ghana, 2019). 
On domestic public debt stock, before the introduction of the Bank of Ghana bills in 1988 to take 
care of excess liquidity in the economy and to provide investment opportunities for banks, 
government could not borrow from the domestic market to support the budget and had to rely on 
the Bank of Ghana (BOG) to finance its deficit by printing money (African Forum and Network 
on Debt and Development (AFRODAD), 2013). This caused strong inflationary pressures in the 
economy and the deterioration of the financial sector (AFRODAD, 2013). The introduction of the 
Bank of Ghana bills saw the emergence of 30-day bills to deal with the short end of the market 
and longer dated bills (182-day and 2-year) and the 3-year and 5-year bonds. These developments 
further enhanced the development of the domestic debt market with the issuance of various short-
, medium- and long-term debt instruments. Thus, the need to finance fiscal deficits, the issuance 
of domestic debt instruments for the purposes of domestic debt management strategy and to 
refinance matured securities have all contributed to increase in domestic public debt stock and  
public debt stock in Ghana (AFRODAD, 2013; Ghana Medium Term Debt Strategy (MTDS), 
2016). Overall, growth in public debt stock for the study period was through fiscal excesses and 
the implementation of domestic public debt management strategy.   
Inflation has been an issue of Ghana’s economy during the past few decades. Inflation experience 
during the study period in Ghana was mixed as the inflation hovered across single, double digit 
and even triple digit rates. Available data indicates that between 1983 and 2018 Ghana recorded 
several experiences of high inflation rate in excess of 25%, suggesting that it was unable to rely 
on monetary policy alone for a stable and reduced inflation rate (Masson et al., 1997, World Bank, 
2019, and Bank of Ghana, 2019). Inflation rate reached an all-time high of 122.8% in 1983 and an 
all-time low of 7.13% in 2012. Inflation rate in the 1980s averaged 48.2%; and 27.61% in the 
1990s, compared to an average of 15.54% in the 2000s (World Bank, 2019). For instance, in the 
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1980s, inflation was largely due to excessive demand pressures as a result of government’s 
expansionary fiscal operations (Sowa, 1991). The huge fall within the same period was as a result 
of the implementation of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) that focused on reducing 
budget deficits and the reliance on bank financing of budget deficit (Sowa, 1991). The high 
investment by government in the economy to stimulate economic growth showed more in the short 
and medium term demand increase than output increase, and thus increased inflationary pressures 
in the country. The high rate of inflation reflected demand pressures driven by fiscal expansion 
and money growth complimented by weak economic growth (Adom et al., 2015). This episode, 
which persisted into the 1990s, coincided with a period of expansionary fiscal deficit and money 
supply growth. Despite the prevalence of price controls between 1983 and 1991 for the study 
period, inflation rate averaged 38.79%, compared to 19.12% between 1992 and 2018. The swing 
in changes continued through the 2000s, although changes within this period were relatively stable 
for the country with single digit rates recorded in 2011, 2012 and 2018 (World Bank, 2019). 
Overall, major changes in inflation rate for the period under review can be attributed largely to 
excess domestic demand generated by expansionary fiscal and monetary policies of the 
government. Inflation rate stood at 9.84% as at end 2018 (World Bank, 2019). 
Figure 1 illustrates trends in public debt (% of GDP) and inflation rate for Ghana using annual data 
for the period from 1983 to 2018.    
Figure 1: Public debt and inflation in Ghana 
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Source: Bank of Ghana (2019) and World Bank (2019)  
A closer look at the graphical representations of public debt and inflation movements in Figure 1 
do appear to suggest relationship between these variables. Trends show that peaks in public debt 
moved quite closely with inflation over the years.  
 
3. Literature review 
Theoretical literature 
Inflation as widely known is a monetary phenomenon and its control lies within the purview of 
monetary authorities. According to Friedman (1968), an expansionary monetary policy will 
increase both real output and general price level in the short-run and only the price level will 
increase in the long-run. In recent times, studies have shown that inflation is not only a monetary 
problem but also of a fiscal concern, with fiscal variables influencing price stability. According to 
Sargent and Wallace (1981), Leeper (1991), and Woodford (1994, 1996, 2001) fiscal and monetary 
policy interaction is crucial in establishing links between public debt and inflation. Hence, the 
control of inflationary pressures in an economy does not depend alone on the control of money 
supply.   
Page | 8  
 
The theoretical arguments on the link between public debt and inflation are centred on the 
Ricardian and non-Ricardian strategy on price level determination. Oscar (2007) argues that when 
government policy is formulated in such a way that intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied for 
any price level, it is a Ricardian policy and a non-Ricardian policy when it satisfy only the 
equilibrium price level. Erdogdu (2002) also shows that the relationship between real value of 
government debt and price level can be Ricardian or non-Ricardian policy depending on the 
fulfillment of government budget constraint. It is Ricardian policy if government budget constraint 
is satisfied for all price levels with an endogenous determination of monetary and fiscal policy 
variables. Ricardian policies assume that the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem holds, suggesting 
that fiscal policy does not create any wealth effects. Ricardian equivalence according to Barro 
(1974, 1989) is based on monetarist view on inflation that government deficit or debt does not 
have significant impact on the determination of price level – implying that government bonds are 
not net wealth.  
For the non-Ricardian policy, inter temporal government budget constraint is an equilibrium 
condition that is not satisfied for every price levels. Before the price level is determined, the level 
of surplus is set such that any threat to the solvency of budget constraint is met by market 
mechanism moving the price level (Erdogdu, 2002). The non-Ricardian policies do not follow the 
Ricardian Equivalence Theorem’s assumption that fiscal policy does not create wealth effect. An 
increase in the value of government bonds affects the households' lifetime budget set. Fiscal 
disturbances affect price level through wealth effect on private consumption demand (Woodford, 
1998). Under a non-Ricardian plan, price level is fundamentally a fiscal phenomenon, with 
monetary aggregates playing a marginal role (Oscar, 2007). 
The validity of the Ricardian policies has been questioned in the developing economies and for 
most periods in the developed economies, such that anti-inflationary policies followed by apex 
banks in these economies may not have been sufficient to guarantee price stability and thus 
requiring an appropriate mix of monetary and fiscal policies (Loyo, 1999; Christiano and 
Fitzgerald, 2000; Attiya et. al., 2008). The FTPL, as embedded in the non-Ricardian policy, seems 
to have particular relevance for developing economies because they issue domestic currency debt 
and often lack the fiscal capacity to mobilise the necessary real tax revenues, giving rise to an 
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‘active’ fiscal authority, while the concerns for capital flows imply that monetary policy tends to 
be ‘passive’ (Beck-Friis et al., 2017).  
More so, because these economies are characterised by large public debt, Blanchard (2004) and 
Favero and Giavazzi (2004) suggest that an increase in interest rate in an economy with large 
public debt aimed at controlling inflation within the target range may increase the cost of debt 
service, debt level, default probability and country premium, which may trigger capital outflows 
and exchange rate depreciation that would affect inflation expectations and in the end inflation 
itself. Hence, according to Woodford (1995, 1998), the source of change in price level can be 
explain by FTPL through the positive wealth effect of government debt policy on private 
consumption demand or increase private spending. 
Kwon et al. (2006) argue that FTPL identifies the wealth effect of government debt as an additional 
channel of fiscal influence on inflation. The theory posits that increased government debt adds to 
household wealth and consequently to their demand for goods and services, leading to price 
pressures. The non-Ricardians in more recent time are of the view that under an active fiscal 
regime, changes in government debt will necessitate changes or fluctuations in inflation even if 
monetary policy is exogenous. Consequently, the determination of price level in an economy will 
require monetary and fiscal policy interactions (Marzieh, 2015).  
Expansionary fiscal policy in the Keynesian view or increased level of debt or a reduction in tax 
rates, according to Branson (1989), Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999) and Wickens (2008) would, in 
the short run, affect aggregate demand by increasing disposable income and generating positive 
wealth effects that may lead to price level pressures. Sargent & Wallace (1981), Leeper (1991), 
and Woodford (1994, 1996, 2001) in their studies have also shown that fiscal and monetary policy 
interaction is crucial in establishing relationship between public debt and inflation. Hence, the 
control of inflationary pressures in an economy does not depend alone on the control of money 
supply.  
The FTPL shows that fiscal authority alone can dominantly influence inflation irrespective of 
monetary policy. According to Sims (2013, 2014, 2016) when governments want to pay off debt 
without increasing taxes and printing money, they pay off the old debt by issuing new debt. The 
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effect of simply rolling over debt is not default, but inflation. Hence, persistent and growing 
borrowings by government would eventually produce inflation regardless of policies followed by 
the monetary authorities. 
Finally, the relationship between public debt and inflation can either be direct or indirect according 
to Nastansky and Strohe (2015). It is direct when the central bank buys public bonds. On the other 
hand, it is indirect when the demand for public bonds is by the private sector. It may also be indirect 
through the banking sector’s demand for public bonds, and through inflation expectation of the 
economic agents owing to high levels of public debt. 
In line with all of the above, we expect government debt through wealth effect to increase 
inflationary pressures. This hypothesis suggests that public debt management policy may have 
consequences on inflation. Against this theoretical background, the study will further review 
empirical studies on the link between public debt and inflation that have used different country 
dataset.  
Empirical literature review 
The effect of public debt on inflation has generated empirical studies with mixed results using 
ordinary least square (OLS) model, vector autoregressive (VAR) model, panel data model and 
vector error correction (VECM) model estimation techniques using data ranging from time series 
to cross-sectional and panel. Even though results from these studies differ depending on study 
countries and estimation methods, the majority of the studies tilt more towards a positive 
association between public debt and inflation. 
Available empirical literature surveyed for this study shows evidence supporting both positive and 
negative impact of public debt on inflation. Pioneering works on government debt and inflation 
was by Musgrave (1949) and Phelps (1973). The study by Musgrave (1949) opened up debate on 
the relationship between public debt and inflation. Although the study focused on the contribution 
of domestic public debt policy to economic stability and in particular to checking inflation, 
Musgrave pointed out that if, during some period, private holders of government securities 
endeavoured to liquidate all or a major portion of their portfolios, and if fiscal authorities were the 
only buyers, the volume of bank credit would expand rapidly. Such an expansion would not in all 
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probability have any direct connection with the legitimate needs of the economy and extremely 
powerful inflationary forces would be generated. Phelps (1973) argued on public finance approach 
to inflation that the central bank should be made the source of inflation, while treasury is left the 
freedom to make compensating variations in government deficit.  
Sargent and Wallace (1981) one of the most referenced pioneering empirical work on government 
debt and inflation process adopted the framework by Phelps (1973) on public finance approach to 
inflation to investigate the relationship among debt management, monetary policy and inflation. 
Sargent and Wallace’s Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic framework revealed that even for the 
Ricardian policies, it is possible for fiscal authority to affect the level of prices. They argued that 
with active fiscal and passive monetary policy, monetary policy would respond by setting growth 
rate of money to generate the money seignorage necessary to satisfy government budget constraint. 
This is contrary to the monetarist view that only monetary aggregates drives inflation if fiscal 
authority acts in a dominant fashion through expansionary fiscal policy. Sargent and Wallace 
(1981) and Walsh (2010) have also argued that whether government debt is ultimately paid for by 
taxes or printing money, it is important in the monetary policy process. After these studies, other 
researchers have tried to assess how monetary and fiscal policies interact in establishing the link 
between public debt and inflation rate.  
The studies by Cardoso and Fishlow (1990), Leeper (1991), Janssen et al. (2004), Bildirici and 
Ersin (2007), Kwon et al. (2006), Karakaplan (2009), Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Faraglia et al. 
(2012), Ahmad et al. (2012), Lopes da Veiga et al. (2014), Ezirim et al. (2014), Ngerebo (2014), 
Bilan and Roman (2014), Nastansky and Strohe (2015), Nguyen (2015), Ezirim et al. (2016), 
Romero and Marin (2017) and Afonso and Ibraimo (2018) revealed a positive impact of public 
debt on inflation. On the other hand, a few studies have shown that public debt has a negative 
impact on inflation. Such studies include Wheeler (1999), Taghavi (2000), Karakaplan (2009), 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Castro et al. (2003), Ezirim et al. (2014) and Essien et al. (2016). 
Table 1 summarises methodology employed on selected studies on the impact of public debt on 
inflation.  
Table 1: Selected studies on the nature of relationship between public debt and inflation 
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Author (s) Title Methodology Association 
Positive Association 




Taghavi (2000) Debt, growth and inflation 
in large European 
economies: 
A vector autoregression 
analysis. 
• Hybrid cointegration analysis 





Kwon et al. (2006) Public debt, money 
supply, and inflation: A 
cross-country study and 
its application to Jamaica. 
 
• Vector autoregression (VAR)  
• Pooled panel OLS 
• Dynamic fixed effects panel  
• Panel generalised method of 
moments (GMM) Arellano-Bond 
Positive 
Bildirici and Ersin 
(2007) 
Domestic debt, inflation 
and economic crises: A 
panel cointegration 
application to emerging 
and developed economies. 
 
• Vector Error Correction models 
• Panel cointegration models 
Positive 
Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) 





Ahmad et al. (2012) Domestic debt and 
inflationary effects: An 
evidence from Pakistan. 
• OLS estimation technique Positive 
Ngerebo (2014) Domestic debt burden, 
debt overhang and 
inflationary pressure in 
Nigeria 
• OLS estimation technique Positive 







• Analysis of relevant statistical data Positive 
Lopes da Veiga et al. 
(2014) 
Public debt, economic 
growth, and inflation in 
African economies. 
• Pooled analysis of relevant 
statistical data. 
Positive 
Nastansky et al. 
(2015) 
A vector error correction 
model for 
the relationship between 
public debt and inflation 
in Germany 
• Vector Error Correction Model 
• Generalised Impulse Response 
analysis 
• Multivariate Beveridge-Nelson 
trend/cycle decomposition 
Positive 
Nguyen (2015) The effects of public debt, 
inflation, and their 
interaction on economic 
growth in developing 
countries: empirical 
• Panel generalised method of 
moments (GMM) Arellano-Bond 
Positive 
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Author (s) Title Methodology Association 
evidence based on 
difference panel GMM 
Romero and Marin 
(2017) 
Inflation and public debt. 
 
• Vector autoregression (VAR)  
• Dynamic fixed effects panel 
• Panel generalised method of 
moments (GMM) Arellano-Bond 
Positive 
Afonso and Ibraimo 
(2018) 
The macroeconomic 
effects of public debt: An 
empirical analysis of 
Mozambique 
• Vector autoregression model 
• Impulse response functions 
• Variance decomposition 
Positive 
Negative Association 
Bleaney (1996) Inflation and public debt • Ordinary Least Square Negative 
(1983-1989) 
Wheeler (1999) The macroeconomic 
impacts of government 
debt: 
An empirical analysis of 
the 1980s and 1990s 
• Vector autoregressive model 
• Impulse response function 








Karakaplan (2009) The conditional effects 
of external debt on 
inflation 
• Panel generalised method of 







Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2010) 





Essien et al. (2016) An empirical analysis of 
the macroeconomic 
impact of public debt in 
Nigeria 
• VAR framework 
• Granger causality analysis  
• Impulse response function 
• Variance decomposition 
Negative 
Source: (Aimola and Odhiambo, 2020) 
Based on the surveyed literature in this study, relationship between public debt and inflation differs 
according to countries, sample period and estimation method. As a result of these findings, it will 
be difficult to draw a general conclusion on the relationship between public debt and inflation for 
this study. The study will therefore proceed to investigate the impact of public debt on inflation in 
Ghana.  
4. Estimation techniques and empirical analysis 
4.1 Estimation techniques 
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The study employed the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach by 
Pesaran et al. (2001) to examine the existence of a cointegration relationship among the variables 
used in this study. Our rationale for adopting this technique, among others, is the robust ability of 
the ARDL technique in analysing short-run and long-run dynamic relationships in small sample 
sizes (Pesaran et al., 2001; Narayan and Smyth, 2005; and Odhiambo, 2020a). Before estimating 
the cointegration relationship, a dummy variable (DUM95) was introduced in the model based on 
Zivot-Andrews (ZA) unit root test to represent a breakpoint in the series. Hence, the estimated 
ARDL specification is expressed as: 
∆𝐼𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 = 𝜓0 + ∑ 𝜓1𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∆𝐼𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜓2𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝐼𝑛𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜓3𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0







∆𝐼𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜓6𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝐼𝑛𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜓7𝐼𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝜓8𝐼𝑛𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 +  𝜓9𝐼𝑛𝑀𝑆𝑡−1
+ 𝜓10𝐼𝑛𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝜓11𝐼𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡−1 + 𝜓12𝐼𝑛𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡−1 + 𝜓13𝐷𝑈𝑀95𝑡−1  + 𝜔𝑡   . ….  (1) 
Where: 
INF = Inflation; 
PD = Public debt; 
MS = Money supply; 
INT = Interest rate; 
GDPC = Economic growth; 
GFCF = Private investment. 
𝜓0  is the constants, 𝜓1 − 𝜓6  are the respective short-run coefficients, 𝜓7 − 𝜓12 are the respective 
long-run coefficients, 𝜔𝑡 is the mutually independent white-noise residuals, In is natural logarithm, 
∆ represents the difference operator, n is the lag length and t is the time period. The dummy 
variable (DUM95) was introduced in Equation 1 to represent a structural break that is 
endogenously determined by Zivot-Andrews test in inflation (INF). Long-run estimates from 
Equation 1 were subjected to the F-test to determine the existence of a long-run relationship among 
the variables in the equation. The computed F-statistic was compared with the appropriate 
asymptotic critical values generated by Pesaran et al. (2001). According to Pesaran et al. (2001), 
if the computed F-statistic exceeds the upper critical bound value, the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration is rejected (see Odhiambo, 2020b). On the other hand, if the computed F-statistic is 
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below the lower critical bound value, the test fails to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. 
If the F-statistic falls between the lower and upper critical bounds, the test is inconclusive. 
The error correction representation of Equation 1 is specified in Equation 2.   
∆𝐼𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡 = 𝜓0 + ∑ 𝜓1𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
∆𝐼𝑛𝐼𝑁𝐹𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜓2𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝐼𝑛𝑃𝐷𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜓3𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0







∆𝐼𝑛𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐶𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝜓6𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝐼𝑛𝐺𝐹𝐶𝐹𝑡−𝑖 + ∑ 𝐷95
𝑛
𝑖=0
∆𝐷𝑈𝑀95𝑡−𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1  
+ 𝜔𝑡   . … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … … ….  (2) 
Where all variables remain as defined in Equation 1. 𝐷95 is the short run coefficient of the dummy 
variable. The error-correction term is lagged once (𝐸𝐶𝑀𝑡−1) and derived from the estimated 
cointegrated equation. The coefficient of the lagged error-correction term 𝛽1  is expected to be 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting the adjustment speed to equilibrium after a shock 
to the system (see also Asongu et al., 2013). 
Data and definition of variables 
The study used annual time-series data from the period 1983-2018. The choice of the period was 
influenced by the availability of credible and reliable data on the variables for Ghana. Data were 
sourced from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank data base. Table 2 
further shows how each of the data was measured and the theoretical expectation of the coefficient 
for each variable. 
Table 2: Data sources and measurement of variables 
Variables Description Measurement Expectation Source 
INF Inflation Consumer prices (annual %) - WB (2019) 
PD Public debt Total public debt (% of GDP) Positive IMF (2020) 
MS Money supply Broad money supply (% of GDP) Positive WB (2019) 
INT Interest rate Monetary policy rate (annual %) Positive IMF (2019) 
GDPC Economic growth Real gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita, measured as gross domestic 
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GFCF Private investment 
 
Gross fixed capital formation (% of 
GDP) Positive  WB (2019) 
Source: Authors’ Compilation. 
 
4.2 Empirical analysis 
4.2.1 Unit root test 
Before estimating the relationship between inflation, public debt, money supply, interest rate, 
economic growth and private investment, it is important to test the stationarity of variables. This 
is to ensure that none of the variables used in this study are integrated of order two or higher. The 
Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF-GLS) and Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests have 
been employed for this purpose both at level and first difference. In addition, the study addressed 
the structural break issues associated with time-series data by using the Zivot-Andrews (ZA) 
structural break unit root test. This test endogenously corrects for one structural break to test the 
order of the integration among the variables. The results of the unit root tests are reported in 
appendix 1 and 2.  
The results of the DF-GLS and PP unit root tests displayed in Appendix 1 show that none of the 
variables are integrated of order two (i.e. I (2)) or higher. The results of the ZA test reported in 
Appendix 2 also show that none of the variables is I (2) and that the structural change in inflation 
took place in 1995. This period coincides with the implementation of the Financial Sector 
Adjustment Programme (FINSAP), which took place in the 1990s. During this period, the country 
also moved from direct control to indirect control of monetary aggregates in achieving inflation 
objectives by focusing largely on the use of market-based monetary policy instruments 
(Brownbridge, 1995; Sowa, 2002 and World Bank, 2019).  
4.2.2 ARDL bounds cointegration test  
The results of the ARDL bounds cointegration test reported in Table 3 show that the calculated F-
statistic exceeds the upper bound critical value, as prescribed by Pesaran et al. (2001). Hence, the 
study rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration, suggesting the existence of a long-run 
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relationship between inflation, public debt, money supply, interest rate, economic growth, private 
investment, and DUM95.  
Table 3: Results of ARDL bounds cointegration test 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
4.2.3. Long-run and short-run estimates  
Given the presence of a long run relationship between inflation and the explanatory variables, long 
run and short run estimates were estimated for Equation 1. These results are presented in Table 4.  
Table 4: Long-run and short-run coefficients  
Panel A: Long-Run Coefficients (Dependent Variable is INF) 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio       [p-value] 
Constant 6.2044*** 7.7520        [0.0000] 
Public debt 1.0109* 1.9294        [0.0651] 
Money supply -0.8682 -1.1763       [0.2506] 
Interest rate -0.1083 -0.1981       [0.8446] 
Economic growth -1.5827** -2.5110       [0.0189] 
Private investment 0.0608 0.1547        [0.8783] 
DUM95 0.2268 0.5837        [0.5646] 
Panel B: Short-Run Results (Dependent variable ΔINF) 
Regressor Coefficient T-ratio       [p-value] 
Δ Public debt 0.7074** 2.3101        [0.0294] 
Δ Money supply -1.8161*** -4.1726       [0.0003] 
Δ Interest rate 0.9291*** 3.5413        [0.0016] 
Δ Economic growth -1.1075** -2.7191       [0.0117] 
Δ Private investment 0.0426 0.1556        [0.8776] 
Δ DUM95 0.1587 0.5679        [0.5752] 
ECMt-1 -0.6996*** -7.8179      [0.0000] 
Dependent 
Variable 
Function F-test statistic 
Cointegration 
Status 
ARDL (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0) Selected based on Akaike Information Criteria 
Inflation 
F(InINF| InPD, InMS, InINT InGDPC, 
InGFCF, DUM95) 
7.04*** Cointegrated 
Asymptotic critical values 
Critical values 
Pesaran et al. 
(2001), 
p.300, Table CI(iii) 
Case III 
1% 5% 10% 
I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
3.15 4.43 2.45 3.61 2.12 3.23 
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R-Bar Squared 0.7172 
F-Statistic 29.7458***    [0.0000] 




Note: ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
The long-run and short-run results presented in Table 4 (Panel A and Panel B) show that the 
coefficient of public debt is positive and statistically significant, irrespective of the period. These 
results suggest that public debt plays a significant role in the process of inflation levels in Ghana, 
regardless of whether it is in the long run or in the short run. This finding is consistent with previous 
studies such as Kwon et al. (2006), Lopes da Veiga et al. (2014), Nastansky and Strohe (2015) and 
Romero and Marin (2017) that found a positive association between public debt and inflation. The 
argument for this result could also be based on a similar reason highlighted in the fiscal theory of 
price level determination. The theory posits that public debt through wealth effect has a positive 
impact on inflation (Kwon et al., 2006). 
The results also show that the coefficient of economic growth is negative and statistically 
significant in both the short run and long run. This suggests that economic growth negatively 
influences the rate of inflation, irrespective of the period. This finding is in line with previous 
studies such as Stockman (1981) that advocates a negative relationship between these variables.  
In the short run, money supply has a negative impact on inflation, but no impact in the long run. 
This result, although contrary to the expectation of the study, is not unusual (see also Bairam, 
1990; West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), 2009). The coefficient of interest rate suggests 
a positive impact on inflation in the short run, but no impact in the long run. The findings, however, 
reveal that private investment and DUM95 have no impact on inflation, irrespective of the period 
in Ghana. This implies that an increase in private investment in Ghana is unlikely to lead to an 
increase in inflation. It also shows that the structural change that occurred in 1995 did not 
significantly affect inflation in Ghana.  The estimated result of the ECMt-1 from Table 4 (Panel B) 
also shows that the sign of ECMt-1 is negative as expected and statistically significant. The 
regression results are a good fit, as indicated by the adjusted R-squared of about 72%. 
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The study performed stability tests for the estimated ARDL framework using the cumulative sum 
(CUSUM) and cumulative sum of square (CUSUMSQ) tests. Brown et al. (1975) and Pesaran and 
Pesaran (1997) have also used these tests for model stability. Figure 2 and 3 show that the plots of 
CUSUM and CUSUMSQ statistics are within the 5% critical bounds, suggesting that the model is 
stable over time. 
Figure 2: Plot of CUSUM test  
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The main objective of this study was to examine the relationship between public debt and inflation 
in Ghana using annual data from 1983 to 2018. The study employed the ARDL approach to 
cointegration and the error-correction model. The study also used Zivot and Andrews (1992) 
model to account for the possibility of a structural break in the series. The findings revealed a 
stable long-run relationship between inflation, public debt, money supply, interest rate, economic 
growth, and private investment in the presence of structural breaks. Similarly, the long-run and 
short-run coefficient estimates from the ARDL framework show that public debt has a positive 
and significant impact on inflation in Ghana. This finding supports the Fiscal Theory of the Price 
Level which posits that government debt adds to household wealth. Hence, the demand for goods 
and services would increase exacting price pressures. Overall, the study confirms the inflationary 
effects of public debt management in Ghana. Hence, the government should be prudent when 
considering increases in public debt to minimise volatility in inflation and its associated risks on 
the economy. The control of inflation dynamics is vital in achieving the objectives of monetary 
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aggregate public debt data. In future studies, researchers may, therefore, wish to use disaggregated 
public debt data in order to disentangle the impact of external and domestic public debt on 
inflation. In addition, the possibility of nonlinearity within the framework could also be 
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Appendix 1: Results of standard unit root test 
Variables 





















InINF -0.0450 -1.9819 -0.1425 -5.1238*** -4.2921*** -5.6049*** -9.7520*** -16.2091*** 
InPD -0.9562 -1.8229 -1.7845 -2.0563 -3.9662*** -4.6730*** -5.2911*** -5.2643** 
InMS -1.0515 -1.7646 -2.2603 -1.7543 -6.5860*** -4.7017*** -6.5099*** -9.1770*** 
InINT -1.5322 -1.9026 -1.8685 -2.3638 -5.0477*** -5.5221*** -5.5153*** -5.5296*** 
InGDPC 1.1817 -1.4541 1.5165 -0.6578 -3.1274*** -3.7159*** -3.5497** -4.0991** 
InGFCF -1.4527 -2.0286 -3.8941*** -3.0442 -3.3516*** -4.6126*** - -5.2587*** 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Note: *** and ** denote stationarity at 1%, and 5% significance levels, respectively. 
 
Appendix 2: Results of structural break unit root test 
Zivot-Andrews structural break unit root test 
 ZA test at level ZA test at first difference 
Variables t-Statistic Break year t-Statistic Break year 
InINF -4.7497 1995 -5.8441*** 1998 
InPD -3.8407 2004 -5.7083*** 2007 
InMS -5.0849* 2006 -6.0286*** 2003 
InINT -2.9708 1999 -6.3665*** 2012 
InGDPC -3.4239 2002 -4.9565* 2010 
InGFCF -3.9519 2006 -7.1585*** 2012 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
Note: ***and ** denote stationarity at 1% and 5% significance level, respectively. 
